The principles mentioned by previous scholars for morality (good and bad) and described in the foregoing discussion are not perfect, although they may seem interesting:

1- There are some good moral habits that placing them in one of the above quadruple principles seems difficult. For instance, philanthropy and self sacrifice and self devotion, could be hardly included in chastity, because it is possible that an individual's desires are moderate, while he lacks self sacrifice and self devotion and philanthropy. That is to say he neither aggresses to the rights of others, nor desires their loss, but at the meantime does not have any self-sacrifice and self-devotion.

Moreover, optimism could not be included in wisdom, because optimism differs with correct distinction.

Perhaps insist on this quadruple division is caused by the ideology of the ancients who assumed most of world's issues based on the number four, and considered four things as the main elements, and divided body's components and temperaments into four. They considered four diseases as the principles of physical diseases, and assumed one of four temperaments for all medicines. While today it is certain for us that none of these quadruple divisions are correct. The same is true for division of principles of good ethics into four.

2- Including wisdom among principles of moral virtues, and its opposite point among the vices is not very appropriate, because moral habits are along the perception system and deal with desires, affections and instincts, not with perceptions, and so interpreting braininess as good morality does not seem appropriate.

3- Insisting that all good moral habits are moderation between two extremes is baseless, because although this is true in some cases but it is untrue in the other cases.

For example, considering tolerance of oppression as the high extreme for justice is not suitable, because high extreme is not applicable to justice. If tolerance of oppression means indolence and numbness, it will be the opposite side of chastity, and if it means fearing of adjudication, it will be low extreme of anger power, and anyway high extreme in justice is meaningless, specially when justice is considered as anger and desire powers being controlled by intellect. It is a certainty that high extreme in this control is senseless.

It is concluded that although moderation of good moral habits is true in the cases like bravery and chastity, but it is not a generalization and is untrue in the case of justice and wisdom.

It is also inferred from above discussions that dividing principles of good and bad attributes into four principles has no clear reason, and even is objectionable in different aspects.

Therefore, it is better not to restrict principles of moral virtues to four. Rather, we have good and bad moral attributes as many as different instincts, desires and affections entrusted in man, and training and balancing each of these instincts and desires for being useful and effective for individual's and society's perfection is a virtue, and deviation of each of them causing degeneration of individual or society is considered as a vice.

On this account, there are vicious and virtuous attributes as many as man's instincts and desires, just as there are physical diseases as many as different systems of body and its components.

The figure mentioned in traditions and narrations of the Prophet's Household A.S. for moral virtues is much more than four. For example, in a well known tradition at the beginning of Osoul Kafi, it is narrated from Imam Sadegh A.S. in respect to hosts of intellect and ignorance, the number of intellect and ignorance hosts is counted to be 75, most part of which are among moral virtues or vices.